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A CROSSROADS, NOT AN ISLAND:
A RESPONSE TO HANOCH DAGAN
Zoë Hitzig* & E. Glen Weyl**
Hanoch Dagan critiques Radical Markets for insufficient attention to the
value of autonomy. While most of his concrete disagreements result from
miscommunications, he appears sympathetic to a theory of autonomy
that is more widespread, and deserves response. Human agency is
fundamentally social, and individuality is primarily constituted by the
unique set of social connections and identities one adopts. In this sense,
flourishing individuals are crossroads of different communities, not selfsufficient islands. Beyond any welfarist benefits, a fundamental value of
Radical Markets is that they aim to instantiate the social nature of
identity and empower agency through diverse community.
Obsessed, bewildered
By the shipwreck
Of the singular
We have chosen the meaning
Of being numerous.
—George Oppen, “Of Being Numerous” (1968)

Hanoch Dagan has written one of the most detailed and thoughtful
reviews of a book one of us authored with Eric Posner, Radical Markets:
Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society.1 It offers so much
grist for discussion that it is the only one of roughly a hundred reviews
so far that seems to demand a detailed response. There is much to agree
with and to be grateful for in his analysis. However, many of his
strongest criticisms of the book are a result of miscommunication or
misunderstanding, which we briefly clarify here. Most importantly,
Dagan appears to be sympathetic to an atomized individualist view of
* PhD Candidate in Economics, Harvard University.
** Founder and Chairman, RadicalxChange Foundation; Principal Researcher,
Microsoft Research; Visiting Research Scholar and Lecturer, Julis-Rabinowitz Center for
Public Policy and Finance, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton University. We are grateful to many interlocutors of the RadicalxChange
community for contributing to these ideas, particularly Marion Fourcade, and especially
to Mona Hamdy and Charlie Thompson for detailed comments.
1. Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and the Just Society, 117 MICH.
L. REV. 1289 (2019) (book review).
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human agency held by some other critics of the book, particularly
Gaspard Koenig.2 While the book itself was somewhat agnostic on
agency, the two of us have since developed a perspective on this issue
that differs from the critics’ views in important ways and that relates
closely to the ideas developed in the book. We devote most of this
response to briefly articulating this view.
Before turning to the issue of autonomy, we will clarify a few points
in response to Dagan’s broader criticism of what he sees as the ultimate
welfarist foundations of the book’s proposals. Dagan claims that the
softer, open-minded autonomist view that he endorses causes problems
for the ideas in Radical Markets.3 We will show why this claim is
mistaken. Most fundamentally, Dagan alleges that Radical Markets
assumes an ultimately welfarist moral view.4 It does not.
Radical Markets employs welfarism much in the same way
economists frequently employ clearly false assumptions—such as the
absence of income effects, risk-neutrality, and the like—that provide a
tractable basis for novel mathematical analysis. These assumptions,
while wrong, are analytically useful. In fact, we are not aware of many
novel policy proposals that have been formally derived or tightly
inspired by other, nonwelfarist policy frameworks, as these are difficult
to reason about formally. 5 Using other frameworks as a formal starting
point thus tends to be conservative in the sense that they make it hard
to derive novel policy ideas.
On the other hand, stringently optimizing given false assumptions
can lead to very poor ideas that are overfit to a false view of the world.
Therefore, none of the policies in Radical Markets are optimal, even
under the narrow assumptions considered; instead they are simple and
approximately optimal under a robust set of assumptions. The book
justifies them not just according to these models but also, as Dagan
highlights, using a range of other informal arguments. 6 This balance can
steer a course between the rock of conservatism and the hard place of
2. Gaspard Koenig, Quand les libéraux contestent la propriété [When Liberals
Challenge
Property],
LES
ECHOS
(June
19,
2018,
4:00
PM),
https://www.lesechos.fr/19/06/2018/lesechos.fr/0301845012112_quand-les-liberauxcontestent-la-propriete.htm [https://perma.cc/4DYM-FE5S]. Most of these conversations
have not been written down; the most detailed hashing out of these views was in a live
debate on “Reinventing Liberalism” on October 24, 2018. GenerationLibre, Conference Reinventing
Liberalism,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
25,
2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v5lwPgsKRj8.
3. Dagan, supra note 1, at 1291.
4. Id. at 1300.
5. While philosophers of science tend to disagree on the extent to which ceteris
paribus claims in economics can legitimately guide policy, many hold that such practice is
largely defensible. For two prominent articulations of this defense, see NANCY
CARTWRIGHT, NATURE’S CAPACITIES AND THEIR MEASUREMENT 161–64 (1989), and DANIEL M.
HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 123–51 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 1, at 1298.
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fragile overoptimization.7 In fact, Radical Markets explicitly rejects the
speculative proposals that Dagan most heavily criticizes precisely
because they are too complex and insufficiently robust. It seems that
most of the concrete disagreements we have can be resolved by
understanding the role welfarism plays in our thinking.
Let us consider one example. Dagan argues that while the COST8
might be appropriate for certain kinds of administrative property, it
would limit choice and autonomy if applied to, for example, primary
residences.9 While the book concedes that such an application should
not be the first, we think Dagan’s analysis is largely misguided.
Certainly, applying a COST to a permanent residence would directly
limit the freedom of the citizen (call her A) on whom the COST is
imposed. But it would significantly increase the freedom and autonomy
of every citizen who might consider purchasing A’s home. A’s freedom
falls by a bit, as she now must pay a premium if she wants absolute and
unchallenged security. Meanwhile, every other citizen gains a
potentially substantial freedom to access a good from which A could
have arbitrarily excluded them, and every other citizen also gains
income. Given the extremely unequal distribution of housing wealth, the
income gained by every other citizen must on average make wealth
more equally distributed.
Whether this latter freedom outweighs the freedom lost by A
requires some metric on freedom, but clearly in extremis Dagan would
have to concede that such a limitation would be freedom enhancing
overall. For example, in a feudal society, imposing a COST on the fiefs of
lords that gives landless serfs a realistic possibility to purchase pieces of
these fiefs must overall enhance freedom. Now whether a COST
imposed on primary residences in the contemporary United States or in
the State of Israel would overall enhance freedom might require subtler
calculation. Dagan, however, does not offer a metric other than
aggregate preference satisfaction by which to judge this. Furthermore,
academic studies of the COST suggest that it would generate Pareto

7. For more on this point, see Vitalik Buterin & E. Glen Weyl, Central Planning as
Overfitting,
RADICALXCHANGE
(Nov.
26,
2018),
https://radicalxchange.org/blog/posts/2018-11-26-4m9b8b/ (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
8. “COST” stands for “common ownership self-assessed tax.” It is an ownership
sharing system in which a piece of property is held on the condition that a higher-value
user does not seek to take the property for themselves. Under a COST system, a possessor
of property loses the right to exclude. Similarly, the public at large gains the right to use
what would otherwise be considered private property. ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL,
RADICAL MARKETS 61–62 (2018).
9. Dagan, supra note 1, at 1298–99.
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improvements or something quite close, and thus any metric consistent
with preference would tend to endorse it.10
While the specifics are different, a structurally similar argument
applies to Dagan’s critique of Quadratic Voting (QV)11: it is not clear, for
example, why QV’s derivation from the welfarist argument about
preference aggregation implies that QV will reduce the role of rational
argumentation in the formation of public policy (and there are many
reasons to believe the reverse). Nor is it clear why his argument for its
flaws applies any less to his preferred application of the system to
campaign finance.
While the virtues of the proposals do not rest on welfarist
foundations, we acknowledge that Radical Markets largely skates over
the role of welfarism in its proposals. The complex interplay between
welfarist reasoning, economic theory, and informal argumentation
about the fairness of institutions indeed demands deeper
methodological exposition that was beyond the scope of Radical
Markets.12
However, precisely because we are not committed to welfarism, we
do not wish to dwell on Radical Markets’s purported commitment
thereto. There is, in our view, a deeper and more interesting issue
related to Dagan’s premise: namely, that some idea of aggregated
individual autonomy is the ultimate good. This view is reasonably
widely held among liberal political thinkers, such as Joseph Raz.13 We
struggle to understand this view, and, as noted above, some forms of it
that focus on preference satisfaction (or “properly informed” preference
satisfaction) do not differ much from the form of welfarism most
commonly applied by mechanism designers. But there is a version of
this view that we think is mistaken. This view has been vocalized in
conversations surrounding Radical Markets for some months now and
thus we wish to offer a clear response to it here. We do not claim Dagan
endorses this view, though it strikes us that he is somewhat sympathetic
to it.
The view to which Dagan seems to be sympathetic is broadly
construed as a “perfectionist liberal” one. On this view, the ultimate
good lies in maximizing “self-authorship” and “self-ownership,” meaning
independence of individuals from social influences and entanglements

10. E. Glen Weyl & Anthony Lee Zhang, Depreciating Licenses, SSRN (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2744810 [https:perma.cc/W6TM-YHWN].
11. “Quadratic Voting” is a voting system different from the classic one-person,
one-vote model. It allows election outcomes to be based on the intensity of individual
voters’ preferences toward the political outcomes available to them. See POSNER & WEYL,
supra note 8, at 82.
12. An elaboration of the methodological lacunae of Radical Markets is presented in
Zoë Hitzig, Lily Hu & Salomé Viljoen, The Technological Politics of Mechanism Design, 86 U.
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019).
13. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986).
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beyond what individuals would choose or wish for themselves even on
reflection.14 Gaspard Koenig is an interlocutor who has repeatedly
expressed this view; he has held out the ideal of maximizing the capacity
of individuals to engage in deeply isolated acts. 15 His favored examples
include individuals who choose to spend extended periods in
isolation—surfing, living isolated in the woods, or choosing the moment
of one’s own death through suicide—as the height of self-actualization.
Many who express this view admit that no individual can truly be an
island unto herself, but still hold out the vision of such island-like
independence as the ideal realization and liberation of an individual
that a liberal state should enable.
This “island” view is mistaken about the nature of agency humans
aspire to and what makes for a self-actualized person. The vision of
selfhood we believe Radical Markets should be judged against is not the
“island” vision but rather one in which individuality is defined by the
communities to which individuals belong. The primary source of
individuality is not independence but a unique pattern of
interdependence. Most activities and characteristics that make a person
an “individual” are meaningful not in isolation or independence but only
in relation to the cultural communities that give these identities
substance and value. The fundamental importance of community to
identity has long been emphasized by conservative, communitarian, and
various sorts of radical critics of liberal societies.16 Yet some liberals,
such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Hannah Arendt, have emphasized the
centrality of community organization to the preservation of liberty. 17
In fact, the people we know who epitomize the sort of selfactualized individuals that seem impossible outside of a liberal society
are not isolated surfers or renegade forest dwellers, archetypes that are

14. This is similar to the definition of “liberalism” used by Amartya Sen, The
Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 153 (1970). Prominent
articulations of perfectionist liberal views are offered in CHARLES LARMORE, THE MORALS OF
MODERNITY (1996); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); and
Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 155
(Susan Mendus ed., 1988). For discussions of how perfectionist liberals vary from other
variants of liberalism, see, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and
Political Liberalism, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2011).
15. See Koenig, supra note 2.
16. Particularly influential criticisms along these lines include ALISON M. JAGGAR,
FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED (1987); and MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed.
1998). A more recent iteration of this criticism is in PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM
FAILED (2018). See also WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 2–3 (1989)
(arguing that the individualism for which liberals advocate “accords with” the
individual’s communal relationships).
17. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951); ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
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far too familiar and scripted to strike most citizens as “original.” Let us
offer two examples of people who, in contrast, strike us as unique.
One is the gay nephew of the former ultraorthodox chief rabbi of the
State of Israel. He is deeply steeped in nearly every Jewish theological
tradition and is ordained as a conservative rabbi, but runs a “Godoptional” shul and was thrown out of the conservative rabbinate for
marrying a Jew to a non-Jew. He knows and incorporates into his
sermons more social theory and sociology than most rabbis, yet his shul
is driven primarily by the contributions of a wide range of artists who
draw on ancient Jewish traditions from all over the world.
A second is an Egyptian living in D.C. She has extensive experience
working for the Saudi Arabian government and her public-facing images
show her wearing a head scarf. She owns half a dozen of the best
restaurants in the city and is a serial technology entrepreneur. She is
deeply involved in global sustainable development efforts led by the
main international institutions. And she teaches and studies applied
ethics at a divinity school and is the mother of three children, all as a
young woman and leading light of society.
None of these characteristics are even explicable when removed
from the deep traditions and large communities associated with them;
they would have no meaning to an isolated individual. Yet the
individuals we described could hardly exist or thrive in a society
dominated rigidly by those traditions. They are only possible within an
open, liberal society. What makes them unique is their ability to draw
on and combine a wide range of rich cultures in innovative ways to
produce new and beautiful combinations, an intercultural version of
what Claude Lévi-Strauss has called bricolage.18 In this view, a society
that facilitates self-actualization is not one that allows every citizen
maximal independence, but instead one that offers an ideal balance of
rich cultural traditions that are raw material for bricolage and the
flexibility to build new identities and cultures from these. It is one that
helps individuals become not isolated islands but vibrant social
crossroads.
Our view of the individual as a crossroads resonates with many
feminist, communitarian, conservative, and radical criticisms of
liberalism—and yet we want to be clear that we are tapping into a
disagreement within liberalism rather than calling out a reason to reject
it full stop. 19 We do not suggest that individuals are just their
connections to present and historical communities, defined in terms of
geography, kinship, culture, and so on. Instead, the individual,

18. CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 16–18 (Julian Pitt-Rivers & Ernest
Gellner eds., Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1966) (1962)
(describing how the “bricoleur” uses what is available in his environment to complete the
task at hand).
19. See supra note 16.
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significantly shaped by these communities, plays a key role in her own
dynamic self-actualization through her connections to groups,
traditions, and ideas. There is room to value autonomy on this view, and
in fact periods of isolation may be a component of self-actualization
(indeed, periods of isolation have critical social meaning in many
cultures, e.g. monastic cultures). But autonomy ultimately constitutes an
emergent property of a complex system of individuals rather than a
static attribute of an isolated individual.
While such a view might appear abstract and philosophical, it
suggests several social institutions. Most directly, this view of human
identity suggests that systems that aim to formalize and verify identities
should draw on rather than subvert (as centralized identity systems do)
or ignore (as so-called “self-sovereign” identity schemes do) social
connections. In particular, nearly all properties that individuals use such
systems to prove (e.g., educational qualifications or date of birth) are
already known to or shared with others (e.g., professors or parents).
Preexisting networks of social cooperation and trust will typically
include such “intermediate verifiers,” allowing verification of identity
properties through the social relationships in which they are embedded
rather than through abstract or externally imposed platforms. One of us
is leveraging these facts to design new identity protocols with Nicole
Immorlica and Matthew Jackson.
It also suggests that the primary aim of economic institutions
should be to facilitate the formation of novel social communities and
public-good-providing polities while allowing older ones to gradually
decay to the extent they no longer serve citizens, a primary basis of our
recent work with Vitalik Buterin.20 It suggests that property should not
belong absolutely and permanently to individuals. Rather, property
should belong to a variety of communities in ways that mirror their rich
and overlapping patterns of connection. Its uses and value ought to flow
among these communities.
On Dagan’s reading, Radical Markets are welfarist means to
autonomy-enhancing ends. This arrangement, to Dagan, threatens to
undermine noble ends through a stubborn attachment to misguided
means. We have argued here that Radical Markets are not built on
welfarist values, nor are they in pursuit of a wholly individualistic
notion of autonomy. On our view, Radical Markets are both means and
ends to fostering dynamic collectives and individual freedom to move
about them, securing a greater degree of equality, a greater diversity,
and a greater depth of collective organization than today’s standard
capitalist institutions could bring about.
As a book, Radical Markets is far from fully instantiating these ideas
and even contrasts with them in some ways. For example, the primarily

20. Vitalik Buterin, Zoë Hitzig & E. Glen Weyl, A Flexible Design for Funding Public
Goods, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming).
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individualistic focus of the chapters on migration sponsorship and Data
as Labor is in tension with the above ideas. The division of COST
revenues described in the book is relatively arbitrary and conforms
poorly to actual community structures; QV assumes a fixed rather than a
flexible polity. Overall, though, Radical Markets ideas point toward
social institutions that come much closer to honoring these values than
do standard capitalist institutions. The COST embodies the idea of
partial collective ownership that decays to the extent that it is hoarded
away from the communities to which it belongs. QV, precisely by
allowing an expression of strength of preference in collective
decisionmaking (of which Dagan is skeptical), allows variable and fluid
identification with a range of collective communities and issues. The
Data as Labor vision—of collective organization to protect individual
economic rights in data and to help balance power in the digital
economy—resonates with de Tocqueville’s and Arendt’s emphasis on
intermediate institutions as a safeguard of liberty.
To the significant extent to which Radical Markets falls short of its
potential, it is because the institutions it describes do not fully confront
the collective-crossroads nature of identity, not because they fail to
safeguard island-like autonomy.

